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October 10, 2003:

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"Deployment of Necessity: Turkey's Military Involvement in Iraq"
Drafted by Erich Marquardt on October 10, 2003
http://www.pinr.com

Turkey's decision to send troops to Iraq highlight's Ankara's need to
control the political and economic future of its southern neighbor. Cemil
Cicek, a spokesman for the Turkish government, bluntly explained Ankara's
decision: "The country most affected by what is going on in Iraq is Turkey."
Just as importantly, Ankara's decision will help to mend relations with the
United States, which asked Turkey to send troops to assist with the U.S.
occupation. Before the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the United States made a
similar request, asking that Turkey allow the U.S. military to use Turkish
bases during its invasion. But the Turkish parliament narrowly voted against
supporting the U.S. intervention. The reason for this being that Turkey did
not want to look to be supporting a unilateral U.S. war -- one in which the
United Nations refused to sanction -- and also because ninety percent of its
population was outspokenly against any Turkish cooperation with the United
States in Iraq. Now with the war phase of the conflict largely over, it will
be easier for Turkey to intervene in Iraq since it can characterize its
involvement as a peacekeeping mission. Turkey's physical intervention in
Iraq is necessary if Ankara is interested in influencing political, economic
and security arrangements in northern Iraq.

When Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party ruled Iraq, Turkey enjoyed thriving
economic benefits from the bustling border trade between the two countries.
Situated between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is in a prime location
to act as a Eurasian economic hub. But after the Gulf War in 1991, and the
subsequent United Nations' sanctions that were placed on Iraq, the Iraqi
state suffered immensely, and its pain had a tremendous effect on Turkey's
economy. Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of 2003,
Ankara claimed that it had suffered $60 billion in lost trade since the end
of the Gulf War due to the U.N. sanctions on Iraq and the subsequent
degradation and destruction of Iraq's infrastructure.

Along with lost trade, Turkey's political and security arrangements in its
southeastern border region remained tense. Southeastern Turkey is home to
the country's large Kurdish population, comprising about 20 percent of the
Turkish population. Beginning in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a
separatist group, began causing security problems for Ankara. Rebelling from
what it perceived as Ankara's mistreatment of its Kurdish population, the
PKK initially sought to establish an independent Kurdish state, partly based
on the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which provided for an autonomous Kurdistan;
the treaty, however, was never implemented due to the growing power of the
Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s. In response
to the Kurdish uprisings of the past two decades, Ankara ruthlessly cracked
down on Turkish Kurds, resulting in much loss of life on both sides of the
ongoing conflict.

In order to flee from the Turkish crackdown, the PKK situated many of its
resources and manpower in northern Iraq. There they enjoyed relative
stability due to the large Kurdish population in northern Iraq that was
protected from Baghdad through a no-fly zone organized by the U.S., Great
Britain and France following the Gulf War. The unity between Turkish and
Iraqi Kurds is what worries policymakers in Ankara. If Turkish and Iraqi
Kurds are able to unite in their quest for independent statehood, it could
incite Turkey's large Kurdish population to attempt to cede off parts of
southeastern Turkey -- such as the Turkish cities of Batman and Silvan --
into a greater Kurdistan.

Fortunately for Turkey, during Operation Iraqi Freedom this declaration of
statehood did not occur. Nevertheless, the Turkish military was prepared in
case an invasion to prevent Kurds in northern Iraq from declaring statehood
became necessary. But now as Operation Iraqi Freedom has come to an end, and
Washington is seeking to develop Iraq's political, economic and military
infrastructure, Ankara has recognized that it is in Turkey's best interests
to join the United States in its pursuit of these objectives.

For its part, the United States could use Turkey's manpower; Turkey has the
second largest army in NATO. Unprepared by the high number of U.S.
casualties in Iraq -- with U.S. forces being injured and killed every week --
the Bush administration has been forced to keep U.S. troops levels in Iraq
unchanged since the end of the major combat phase of the war. Initially
expecting to pull troops out shortly after the fall of Baghdad, these plans
have been scrapped due to the continued multifaceted resistance movements
against the U.S. occupation forces. This has prevented Washington from
allowing its reserve forces to return back to the United States.

The Bush administration, therefore, continued its pleas to the Turkish
government to send troops to assist in the U.S. occupation. To help coax
Ankara's involvement, Washington issued Turkey an $8.5 billion loan in late
September dependent on Turkey's support of the U.S. in Iraq. The Bush
administration also assured Turkey that it would work to stifle the
activities of the PKK in northern Iraq. Up until now, the U.S. has taken a
laissez faire approach to the PKK and other Kurdish groups because the Kurds
have been cooperative of U.S. plans in Iraq and are assisting in keeping the
northern part of the country stable -- this despite the fact that the PKK is
listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization. The Bush
administration was required to provide this assurance to Ankara since
Turkish troops would not be concentrated in northern Iraq, but instead
around Baghdad, which is populated by Arab, Sunni-Muslims rather than by
ethnic Kurds. This deployment location would prevent Turks and Kurds from
intermingling -- a situation that could easily breakdown into violence and
one that Washington would like to avoid.

Even with this limitation, Iraq's Kurdish population is upset; they fear
that Turkey will suppress their political ambitions and block their quest
for autonomy. Iraqi Kurds also dislike Washington's close relationship with
Ankara; indeed, they still remember in 1991 when former President George
H.W. Bush encouraged them to rise up and revolt against Saddam Hussein --
when they did, the Bush administration withheld support for their actions
and did not prevent Saddam Hussein from ruthlessly crushing the rebellion.

Non-Kurdish Iraqis have also reacted coldly to the troop deal between
Washington and Ankara. Members of the Iraqi Governing Council -- the group
installed by the Pentagon to act as a temporary government in Iraq --
publicly rejected Washington's decision to allow Turkish troops to assist in
the occupation. Nabeil al-Moussawi, of the Iraqi National Congress, which is
headed by Ahmad Chalabi -- who is a member of the Governing Council --
warned, "The Governing Council's stand is against the presence of troops
from neighboring countries without exception, and Turkey is one of these
countries." Indeed, Iraq's current leaders fear the security risks in
allowing Ankara to gain influence in Baghdad's domestic affairs.

There is also the constant fear that Ankara may attempt to lay claim to
parts of northern Iraq that it considers part of Turkey. Ankara has floated
the idea of pursuing legal claims over Kirkuk and Mosul, the two former
Ottoman Empire cities ceded to Iraq in the 1920s. Nationalist sentiment
inside Turkey claims that the country was stripped of their rights when
pieces of the Ottoman Empire were broken off after World War I. This history
is yet another concern of the Iraqi Governing Council and explains their
cautious outlook toward Turkish troop deployment. However, since the Iraqi
Governing Council holds no real power in Iraq, it will ultimately be up to
Washington, not Baghdad, to decide whether Turkish troops will be deployed.

In the end, Turkey's troop involvement in Iraq will be necessary if Ankara
is able to protect its future interests in the region. Ankara needs to have
troops stationed inside Iraq in order to carefully monitor Kurdish actions
in the northern part of the country. By having troops active in the border
area between Turkey and Iraq, in addition to the central part of Iraq,
Ankara will have sandwiched the various Kurdish factions between its
powerful military. This military position will give Ankara the ability to
swiftly take action against any threatening movement by the PKK, the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) or other Kurdish groups such as the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). While the United States would not
necessarily condone such an attack, it is not clear how long the United
States will remain in force in Iraq, as the war is becoming increasingly
unpopular at home and the Bush administration could lose the upcoming
presidential election in 2004 to a candidate that may have the political
leverage to pull U.S. forces out of the country.

It is for these reasons that the Turkish government has decided to send
troops to assist the U.S. occupation of Iraq. From the point of view of
Ankara, Turkey's national interests in Iraq are more important than the
political ramifications of becoming involved. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
leader of the majority Justice and Development Party, said before the start
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, by failing to become involved in the affairs of
Iraq, "Turkey's long-term interests and even security could be in jeopardy."

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR
approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved,
leaving the moral judgments to the reader. PINR seeks to inform rather
than persuade. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or
broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All
comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

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