The Inside Assyria Discussion Forum #5

=> The Importance of Pluralism for a Stable Iraq....

The Importance of Pluralism for a Stable Iraq....

Posted by pancho (Moderator) - Wednesday, April 13 2011, 12:09:24 (UTC) from *** - *** - Windows NT - Internet Explorer Website: Website title:

...this is the entire paper Roma wrote....it has background information on Iraq I found interesting. Introduction: “If Iraq’s pain has been great in the modern era, so too, has been its betrayed promise” (Ajami 10) Iraq has an extremely ethnically and religiously diverse population. It is made up of majority Arabs (divided between the Shi’ia and Sunni sects of Islam), the Kurds (an ethnic group more closely related to the Persians) and a small population of religious and ethnic minorities that include Turkomens, Assyrians, and Jews among others (Byman 64). Before the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq is estimated to have had the “best educated, most secular, and most progressive population of all of the Arab states” (Byman 72). However, the cleavages in Iraq’s society have been exacerbated by a 35 year dictatorship, 13 years of suffocating sanctions and, as of 2003, an ongoing foreign occupation. Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, there has been a severe increase in the levels of violence within in Iraq, dividing along ethnic and religious lines. This paper seeks to understand why this violence is taking place when, historically, Iraq has a relatively strong tradition of religious and ethnic diversity and tolerance for that diversity. This paper argues that accepting ethnic and religious pluralism is critical for stabilizing Iraq. Moreover, pluralism needs to be respected by external actors, including aid groups, and internal processes that include, among other issues, a revised constitution. I assert that the current levels of violence against Iraq’s Christian minority are, in part, the result of unilateral U.S. support for Christian faith-based aid groups immediately following the U.S. invasion. Combined with the impracticality of the current Iraqi constitution, this has led to a lack of acceptance of pluralism in Iraq. The first section of this paper will briefly look at Iraq’s history to analyze the levels of pluralism that existed from Mesopotamia to Iraq after the Ottoman Empire and finally a look at Saddam’s Iraq and post-2003 Iraq. The second section will look at the literature on the benefits that religious pluralism provides to a society; additionally, it will analyze the role of external involvement in Iraq and the consequences this has had for the local Christian population. The third section will break down the internal issues that are barriers to a pluralistic and democratic society in Iraq; these issues include elections, the current Iraqi constitution, and the potential for an autonomous Kurdistan. Section I. Mesopotamia Iraq has a very rich and important history. This section looks at ancient Iraq, the Ottoman empires collapse, Iraq under Saddam’s rule, and post-2003 Iraq. Present day Iraq was known as Mesopotamia for hundreds of years; considered the cradle of civilization the ancient empires of Babylon, Assyria, and Akkad flourished here. Ancient Mesopotamia produced many ‘firsts’ including the first written code of law and the first city-state as well as the first advanced social, political, and economic institutions (Ismael, Ismael 610). This area later became part of the Persian, Greek and then Roman empires until the 7th century when Baghdad, the capital of present day Iraq, became integral to the Islamic world, beginning with the Abbasid caliphate (“Iraq” Britannica). The Ottoman Empire was the last Islamic empire to rule the region, from the 16th century until the early 20th century, when the British took control. Present day Iraq was carved out of the crumbling Ottoman Empire by the British in 1921, it included the regions of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul (Ismael, Ismael 610). Ancient Iraq has a history of religious and ethnic diversity and, more importantly, tolerance for that diversity. Non-Muslims under the Ottoman Empire were allowed to retain their religious practices in return for paying higher taxes. Known as the millet system, it provided the protected religious minorities (dhimmis) – which included Christians and Jews – with social, economic, and cultural freedom but not political opportunities (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 29). Radwan Masmoudi explains that “belief in freedom of religion is very strong in the Muslim conscience and in Muslim theology” and that the “Quran does support religious freedom, freedom to disbelieve, and the right to change one’s belief” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy”18). The history of Iraq under Ottoman rule is a history of ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity and significantly higher levels of tolerance for that diversity than the religious bloodshed that was going on in Europe at the time. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, however, brought a power struggle to the region for the first time in several hundred years. After the Ottoman Empire Present day Iraq is an externally constructed state lacking a unifying identity; the south was dominated by the Shi’ia Arabs, the center by the Sunni Arabs and the north was dominated by the non-Arab Kurdish and a mix of the remaining religious and ethnic minorities (Dawisha 553). Politically, from 1921 until 1958 Iraq was ruled, with the help of the British, by the Hashemite monarchy which adopted a parliamentary system similar to that of the British (Dawisha, Dawisha 37). The 1920 League of Nations mandate explained that Iraq’s minorities, particularly the Assyrians and Kurds, should be protected; additionally the British had specified social and economic aid for them (Rayburn). However, in Britain’s hurry to leave Iraq over the next decade, it failed to include the protection of minorities in the new Anglo-Iraqi treaty (Rayburn). By 1958 there was unrest among a portion of Iraq’s population. Tired of limited Iraqi sovereignty and the British use of Iraq’s oil, a military coup ended the royal regime and Iraq became a republic (Ismael, Ismael 611). As a region made up of Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shi’ias, Turkmen, Assyrians, Jews, and Chaldeans it was troublesome when the minority Sunni Arabs came to power. While the British withdrew, the Sunni population took control and quickly suppressed Iraq’s Kurds, Assyrians, and Shi’ias in an attempt to consolidate power (Rayburn). In 1963 the Ba’athist party came to power, with the aid of the CIA[1] (Ismael, Ismael 611) and by 1979 Saddam Hussein took control and Iraq became decidedly secularist[2] (Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler 501-502). However, prior to 1968 Iraq was one of the most advanced countries in the Islamic world, with a comparatively well educated (including women) and affluent population and was reasonably tolerant towards some minority groups (Inglehart et al. 501-502). It is surprising that this background could lead to the levels of xenophobia, sexism and religiosity present in Iraq today (Inglehart et al. 501-502) but much of this can be explained by the polarizing effect of Saddam Hussein’s rule of Iraq. Saddam’s Iraq Adeed Dawisha quotes an Iraqi intellectual to explain the main problem with Iraq: “Any student of contemporary Iraqi history will discover…that the primary factor for the persistence of tension and violence [is] the brittleness of Iraqi national identity” (Dawisha 553). Iraq’s previous lack of a unifying identity made it easy for Saddam to manipulate different aspects of an enforced Iraqi identity to consolidate his power. After dominating the Ba’athist party, Saddam used “ruthless coercion, financial co-optation and a complex web of security agencies spying on the population and on each other” to subdue the Iraqi population (Ismael, Ismael 612). However, it was his use of identity manipulation that cemented his rule and is a prominent factor in Iraq’s ethnic and religious violence today. Saddam’s manipulation involved emphasizing one identity over another depending on his political aspirations at the time (Dawisha 556-557). During the Iran-Iraq war he called upon an Arabist identity when fighting the non-Arab Iranians (Dawisha 556-557) but at home this translated into a policy of “Arabization” that included the forced relocation of ethnic groups like the Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmens, offering financial incentives to Arabs to settle in these places (Byman 68). During the Gulf crisis over his occupation of Kuwait, Saddam discarded his steadfast secularism to opt for an Islamic identity to unite Iraqi’s against the United States (Dawisha 556-557). According to Dawisha, “Saddam had become almost totally reliant on the country’s Islamic identity, a cornerstone of which was to emphasize the ‘Christian’ identity of the ‘other’ – those who were dropping bombs on Iraq” (561-562). The crippling sanctions imposed by the international community alienated the urban and westernized middle classes and made Saddam focus especially on tribalism to muster a support base (Dawisha 563); in addition to tribalism he exacerbated ethnic and personal differences to maintain power (Byman 63). Dawisha quotes a member of the Ba’ath party as saying “secessionism, sectarianism and tribalism….are tearing the unity of society to pieces” (554). While Saddam attempted to cross the Sunni-Shi’ia divide by calling on an Arabist identity, he excluded the non-Arab Kurds and the remaining minorities (Dawisha 558). His failure to call on a specifically Iraqi national identity alienated different cadres of Iraqi society. Saddam used a heavy hand to keep a strained and inconsistent peace. His violent suppression of opposition groups, or groups that might become oppositional, meant that Iraq stayed united but his mistake was to unite through force and not through a common, lasting, Iraqi identity. These issues of conflicting ethnic and religious groups have left permanent scars on the country’s past and problems for its future. Daniel Byman explains the concern over the lack of power sharing under Saddam and the violence of his regime have potentially ruined any memories of power sharing in Iraq’s more ancient history (Byman 69). As a result, Iraq has “no civil society, and few robust institutions, on which to build its democracy” and it further “lacks a Charles de Gaulle, a Nelson Mandela, or even a Corazon Aquino who can serve as a symbol of unity for a new democratic government” (69). These scars from Iraq’s recent past are barriers to building a peaceful and cohesive Iraqi future, as is evident by looking at the conflicts arising in Iraq’s post-Saddam era. Post-2003 Iraq In the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, “’legitimation’ or ‘constituency building’” were not the first steps, dropping bombs were (Ismael, Ismael 619). The invasion added to the list of issues blocking the creation of a stable and sustainable Iraq. The destruction of historical artifacts and sudden and devastating unemployment were two significant factors that contributed to the widespread anger and resentment of the occupying coalition. The U.S. media down-played the significance of the looting of Iraq’s museums and destruction of its cultural artifacts; however Ismael and Ismael aptly describe the frustration as the “free rampage of organised looting of cultural, educational and health facilities and the wholesale burning of historical records symbolised an intentional policy of cultural cleansing” that was especially painful for the Iraqis that were proud of their unique history (616). “The cultural connection to their locale extended far beyond the Baghdadi Caliphate into the very origins of ‘civilisation’ itself” explain Ismael and Ismael, which made the American protection of the Ministry of Oil and their lack of intervention to protect Baghdad from looting all the more frustrating for Iraqi’s(616). The second issue was the resentment and desperation that was present in Iraq as a result of sky-rocketing unemployment figures. Paul Bremer, the U.S.’s top civil administrator in Iraq until 2004, put in place economic policies that rapidly resulted in half a million jobless people and made “resistance to U.S. occupation the only viable alternative to unemployment” (Ismael, Ismael 617). Furthering this was the involvement of U.S. corporations and foreign workers that exacerbated the 67% unemployed Iraqi’s and threatened small businesses, which in turn led them to fund “armed resistance for self protection” (Ismael, Ismael 617). In addition to these issues, the risk of death after the invasion increased to 58 times higher than it was before the war (Ismael, Ismael 616). Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler argue that it is this existential insecurity that leads to xenophobia and strong in-group solidarity (Inglehart et al.) further dividing Iraqi society. Byman explains the skeptics’ argument, that “Iraq has too many fractures, and too few important preconditions such as a strong civil society, for democracy to blossom” (48). In 2003, Byman warned that without properly administered external aid, Iraq would have to confront several issues including, “a weak government that engenders security fears, a lack of a cohesive identity to unify Iraq’s different communities…a poorly organized political leadership, and a lack of history of democracy” (49) and most of these challenges are still very much an issue for stabilizing Iraq. These barriers to peaceful coexistence in Iraq are centered on issues of security (Byman 49) and the power dynamics between the ethnic and religious groups is critical. Identities are “hardened by past conflicts and tragedies” Byman explains (53) and this brings to mind cases like the crisis Rwanda in the 1990s where power shifts have given way to massive bloodshed. It is important to not shift power too abruptly, to entirely disenfranchise the ruling elite and leave them without options while giving the opposing group power. In cases like these, revenge can become extremely violent. While the U.S. removed the Sunni Ba’ath party from power and replaced it – and most of the Sunnis in government – with Shi’ias a Sunni backlash has plagued Iraq since. Neither state-building under the British, nor nation-building under the Ba’athists, have been entirely successful in Iraq and the additional U.S. interest in Iraqi oil has further alienated the Iraqi’s and has lent more legitimacy to the resistance movement (Ismael, Ismael 621). Ajami has this to say about the future of Iraq: The convenience that created Iraq in the 1920s may still hold, but it would have to be a different Iraq. A country of genuine pluralism…the ‘ownership’ of a new Iraq would have to be shared; its vocation would have to be a new social and political contract between state and society and among the principal communities of the land (17). Through a look at Iraq’s past it is clear that, for the majority of Iraq’s history, ethnic and religious pluralism in one of the most diverse countries of the region has remained relatively peaceful. It wasn’t until the 20th century that ethnic and religious cleavages were politicized and it wasn’t until the 21st century that they consequently turned violent following the U.S. invasion. To understand and resolve these issues it is necessary to explore the importance of protecting religious and ethnic pluralism, the role of external actors, and the internal barriers. Section II. The Importance of Pluralism “The issue of religious freedom is critical”, explains Robert George, “religious pluralism minus religious freedom does not equal democracy” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 8). After looking at the history of Iraq, it is important to analyze the necessity for pluralism, and the legislation that deals with it, in order to understand the mistakes that were made following the U.S. invasion; one of which is the violence against the Christian community in Iraq. It is obvious religion is playing an increasingly important role in international relations which makes it all the more important to emphasize the protection of religious and ethnic pluralism in ethnically and religiously diverse countries like Iraq. For Brian Grim the benefits of religious freedom are vital; its presence directly relates to other freedoms such as “civil and political liberty, press freedom, and economic freedom”, and contributes to the “longevity of democracy” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 22). Grim goes on to explain that as “religious groups make contributions to society and become an accepted part of the fabric of society, religious freedom is consolidated” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 22). However, if religious freedom is restricted it can lead to more hostility and disagreements (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 22). William Saunders agrees that “where religious freedom is permitted...citizens are likely to understand that respect for democratic values and institutions is essential to the common good” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 9). The International Religious Freedom (IRF) Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1998 to defend groups around the world from persecution for their religious beliefs; it created a separate commission on international religious freedom, among other things. However, there have been several concerns raised about the IRF Act including the idea that having a “bureaucracy designed to promote religious freedom…suggests a hierarchy of freedoms, with religious freedom placed above others”; Philip Gordon argues it is important to question why it is considered more important than press freedom, women’s rights, minority rights, free speech and the like (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Act” 16). However, according to Gordon, a second and more disconcerting problem with the IRF policy is that it “runs the risk of reinforcing the stereotype of a hectoring, moralistic, and even imperialistic U.S., which casts itself as the arbiter of fairness around the world” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Act” 17). Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, according to Galston, does not “suggest that religious freedom implies the unfettered right of foreign missionaries to cross international borders for proselytizing purposes” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 23). Additionally, Galston agrees with Jose Casanova’s argument that the “uninformed enthusiasm of American missionaries has often backfired, driving indigenous religious forces into a tighter alliance with repressive regimes” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 23). Galston accurately adds that just because “every human being is guaranteed the right to change his religion does not imply that citizens of other countries enjoy an equally fundamental right to persuade him to do so” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 23). Imam Mohamed Magid argues that “international law should not allow missionary groups from any faith to take advantage of the needy” and that “conversion or proselytism should not be connected to a political agenda” (“Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” 6). The issue of externally supported faith-based aid is especially salient to understanding the current levels of violence against Christians in Iraq. There are several ways the U.S. can help countries like Iraq come to terms with religion and democracy. Jean Bethke Elshtain argues the first step the U.S. should take is to make it “clear that Muslim citizens need not choose between an all encompassing secularism or an all encompassing faith; that separation of church and state institutionally does not require the separation of religion and politics culturally” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 10). Countries like Iraq could use a “twin tolerations” approach, a term coined by Alfred Stepan that invites a mutually respectful and constructive relationship between religion and state, or Daniel Philpott’s concept of “differentiation” that allows degrees of “legal, constitutional separation between religion and state” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 10-11). After establishing the importance of accepting pluralism, the next step is to look at the two areas – external involvement and internal issues - that are impeding its implementation in Iraq. External Involvement To the Arab world, secularism had failed by the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War (“U.S International Religious Freedom Policy”15). With the failure of colonialism and then secularism, Philip Gordon asserts that many Muslims looked to Islam for “the Answer”; he cites the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rise of the Islamists in Egypt, and the Western-backed Mujahedeen[3] as examples (“U.S International Religious Freedom Policy” 15). However, this is not true of all Muslims societies, especially today. Countries like Indonesia, India, Senegal and Albania have large Muslim populations but are functioning democracies with both political and religious freedom (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 8). Additionally, the 600 million Muslims that live in democracies around the world illustrate that Islam and democracy can work together (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 20). There is a significant amount of support for democracy in Iraq but the support for rule by religious authority is also considerably high (Inglehart et al. 500). For Gordon, “scholars have not focused on religion as a major factor in international affairs, because it has not been one until recently” and “now it is time to catch up” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 15). The role that external actors have played in shaping the conflicts in Iraq is significant. Aid organizations, faith-based organizations, and the U.S. government have contributed a considerable amount of time, money and political risk in Iraq. However, it is important to look at the overall role of external actors in situations like these and understand the advantages and disadvantages they pose; in this case it is especially important to understand the role of faith-based organizations to understand the treatment of religious pluralism. William Galston explains that it has often taken centuries of “bloody religious strife” to show societies that toleration for religious pluralism was the best option (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 35). He also warns that if the Shi’ia government in Iraq “is not convinced that decent treatment of minority religions will better serve its interests than discrimination or suppression…it will take more violence and death over an extended period to drive the message home” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 35). Abdolkarim Soroush advises against exporting religious freedom, explaining it has done more harm than good in the past. “Exporting democracy, religious freedom, [and] human rights” where the Middle East is concerned, argues Soroush, “must be at the abstract level” because if “you export and impose it, it will produce the opposite effect” (“U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy” 21). Jennifer Bryson also suggests that the best way to promote liberal political theology is to implement the “affirmation and protection of peaceful pluralism and spreading a ‘do unto others as you would have done unto you’ culture of religious freedom” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 32). The concept of factions will be a key component to keeping Iraq balanced. In Iraq, democracy is threatened by “support for Islamic rule among the Shi’ia Arabs, and by nostalgia for Saddam among the Sunni Arabs” but, Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler point out, each of these factions’ potential is limited due to the cleavages in Iraq’s society (501). They sum it up by explaining that “Iraq’s natural pluralism creates difficulties but it also provides checks and balances” (Inglehart et al. 501). According to Harris Mylonas, many countries have religiously diverse societies but “religious cleavage is not the most important one in all of these societies…some societies have overlapping cleavages, where religion overlaps with ethnicity…” while other societies have “crosscutting cleavages, where people who share the same religion identify with different ethnic groups or regions of a country” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration 16-17). He explains that, in situations like the latter, this type of “configuration dampens the salience of the religious cleavage” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration 16-17). This is especially relevant to cases like Iraq that have overlapping religions and ethnicities, particularly the presence of Sunni and Shi’ia Kurds and Sunni and Shi’ia Arabs. This further supports the argument that factions can keep Iraq balanced. For example, Kurds could choose to identify as Sunni or Shi’ia, or as Kurds; likewise the Arabs could choose to identify themselves as Sunni or Shi’ia, or as Arabs, creating overlapping interests and identities. Example: Iraq’s Christians and the Lack of Oversight The case of the Christians in Iraq is an example of the violence that occurs when the rules of religious and ethnic pluralism are not followed. Since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq the violence against the minority Christian population has been escalating. There were approximately 1.4 million Christians before the U.S. invasion and now only about half remain in Iraq. Most have been leaving Iraq for neighboring countries like Syria and Jordan to find safety. The violence has come from non-state actors, roving bands of Shi’ias and Sunnis that are not only fighting each other for power in Iraq but have been persecuting the Christian minority as well. However, looking at Iraq’s history of tolerance and the literature on religious freedom and pluralism, I assert that this violence against Christians is not an inherent part of Iraq’s history; rather, it is a backlash against foreign intervention. Iraq is an especially complex situation because it has had significant outside influence from, first, the British and then the Americans, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned earlier, Saddam called on Iraq’s Islamic identity during the Gulf War as a reaction to the Christian ‘other’ that was attacking Iraq. This issue is just as relevant today as it was in the early 1990s because it is again a Christian country that dropped bombs on Iraq, destroyed its infrastructure and economy, and allowed its artifacts and museums to be looted. While preferential treatment for faith-based aid organizations is not the only factor contributing to the violence against Iraq’s Christians, it is an example of the consequences of rejecting pluralism. According Salam Al Marayati, Christian missionaries were given “preferential access” to Iraq by the U.S. after the 2003 invasion (“Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” 9). Faith-based organizations have several benefits including their often immense range, the wide array of issues they cover and because they tend to have special relationships with local societies (“Decent Shelter for All” 7). Although religious institutions, historically, have provided valuable responses to emergencies like natural disasters, Marayati explains that “perceptions of those Christian groups became a negative, adding tension to Christian-Muslim relations” (“Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” 9). It is precisely because of situations like these that governments like the U.S. must defend religious freedom but “must avoid the perception of preferential treatment for Christianity” (“Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” 10). Gerald Hyman agrees with Marayati that it is “risky and possibly counterproductive to engage on a theological or explicitly religious basis with U.S. government support” precisely because “the U.S. democracy promoters could easily look like official missionaries, and the efforts could easily look like a U.S. government effort at religious conversion” (“Religion, Democracy and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 23). Unfortunately, this is almost exactly what happened immediately following the U.S. invasion. ABC News reported, shortly after the U.S. invasion in 2003, that faith-based aid groups like Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse were “’poised and ready’ to roll into Iraq to provide for the population’s post-war physical and spiritual needs” (Caldwell 1). In Graham’s own words he and his organization were there to “reach out to love them and to save them, and as a Christian [he did] this in the name of Jesus Christ” (Caldwell 1). According to the ABC article, since 1990 the number of missionaries in Islamic countries has quadrupled (Caldwell). Caldwell interviewed Donna Derr, an official for Church World Service, about her disapproval for the work of aid groups like Graham’s. Caldwell, paraphrasing Derr, explains that “ the 2,000 year-old Christian churches in Iraq – whose members are a tiny minority in a vast Muslim population – have worked extraordinarily hard in the last decade to ‘develop their place’ in the community” and that Muslims and Christians were getting along (Caldwell 2). Derr told Caldwell, “I would hate to see the tenuous balance that has been created made unbalanced by the entry into Iraq by peoples who may have less sensitivity” and that “our military has created one chasm. We don’t want to see our humanitarian assistance create another” (Caldwell 2). In May 2004, Ariana Eunjung Cha, of the Washington Post, reported that these Christian missionary groups were drawing criticism for “endanger[ing] the lives of secular aid workers and the military because insurgents may associate Christianity with Western domination, or because they disguise their intentions” (Cha 1); the latter point was an accusation frequently leveled against the aid groups. Missionary work, in places like the Middle East, is closely associated with colonialism and therefore understandably resented. Aware of the repercussions, it is also clear that Christians in Iraq did not seek preferential treatment. CBS’s “60 Minutes”, in a report on Iraq in 2007 titled “Iraq’s Christians in Peril”, interviewed Reverend Andrew White and a member of the U.S. military discussing what life was like for the Christians in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. Rev. White, who had been in Iraq before the U.S. invasion during the rule of Saddam, said “Iraq is clearly worse now [than it was under Saddam]. There is no comparison between Iraq now and then. It’s the most difficult it’s ever been for Christians probably ever in history [in Iraq]” (“Vicar: Dire Times for Iraq’s Christians”). The member of the U.S. military explained that the U.S. was not allowed to protect churches, as part of a ‘hands off’ religion policy but also that the “Christians don’t want [the military] to guard the churches openly. They feel if [the military is] overtly protecting the churches, someone underground covertly will come in and murder the Christians because they’re collaborating with the U.S. soldiers” (“Vicar: Dire Times for Iraq’s Christians”). While the U.S. military was apparently not allowed to protect religious sites, the comment the soldier makes regarding the fear the Christian community had about receiving preferential treatment is important. A ‘hands off’ policy might have worked for not protecting religious sites but it clearly was not a policy used with aid organizations. Additionally, when it comes to an important issue like pluralism there might be a greater need for enforcing the protection of pluralism rather than opting for a ‘hands off’ policy. The American government, through its support of specifically Christian, faith-based organizations – like Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse – and religious rhetoric made the invasion seem like a Christian war against Islam. In retaliation, Christian missionaries and aid groups as well as indigenous Christians were significantly easier to target then U.S. soldiers and therefore bore the brunt of the violence. Although this may appear to be a conflict between differing religions it should instead be seen through a political lens. If it were merely a religious struggle and Muslim Arabs were attempting to get rid of all other religious and ethnic groups (in this case minority groups), they had hundreds of years to accomplish this. Likewise, if this was purely a religious conflict, other religious groups in Iraq, including the Jews, would be facing the same levels of violence but they are not. Politically, Iraq was first occupied by the British in the 1920s, attacked by the U.S. in the Gulf War in the early 1990s and is now occupied by an American-led coalition. In all of these cases, the foreign country has been Christian in association and the most recent war with Iraq made the mistake of showing too much favoritism towards Christian aid groups. However, it is not just Christian aid groups that have disproportionately aided one group and contributed to polarizing Iraq further. Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Iraq have been influenced by private funding to favor one sect of Islam over another; in this case most of the funding comes from the Salafi brand of Sunni Islam found in the Gulf States and therefore disproportionately aids Sunni Muslims (Murphy 2) and further polarizes Iraq’s religious groups. One of the problems is the lack of institutions whose purpose it is to monitor the distribution and ethics of faith-based aid. There are several groups that have agreed to limit their proselytizing during aid and relief projects, but a significant number of groups have not committed to this. ‘Codes of conduct’ have been established by several prominent faith-based aid groups, including the World Council of Churches[4], to limit the amount and type of proselytizing that is allowed to accompany aid missions. However, Matthew Richards argues that these “voluntary codes are not designed as substitutes for national or international regulations” and while they might support ideas such as “’respect’, ‘courtesy, and ‘sensitivity’…they are vague and unenforceable laws” (“Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” 9). These are all examples of the paramount importance of governments keeping a watchful eye on faith-based aid and the messages it can send[5]. While the bulk of the issues with disproportionate and unmonitored aid occurred right after the U.S. invasion, there are still currently cases of plurality not being upheld. A final area of concern regarding the Christians of Iraq – and the need for the U.S. to play an impartial religious role for the safety of Iraqis – is an amendment that was added to H.R bill 2601 in 2005. Assyrian Congresswoman Anna Eshoo’s amendment calls on “the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to pay special attention to the welfare of ChaldoAssyrians [Iraq’s Christians]” (Eshoo). Additionally, the amendment calls on “the President and his administration to work with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to dedicate funding for the promotion of welfare and education, as well as the resettlement for these minority groups” (Eshoo). While the situation is a tragedy and a grave concern for human rights abuses and religious persecution, I assert this act would only put the remaining Christians in Iraq in even more danger. For the U.S. to continue to claim this is not a war of Christianity versus Islam but to attempt to provide protection to a small section of a war-torn country, specifically the Christian section, would only endanger their lives further and sharpen the cleavages. It would become a repeat of the preferential treatment that was given to Christian aid organizations following the U.S. invasion that has been causing this violent backlash. To now attempt to single out the Christians – in a country with an incredibly high death toll that is affecting all sectors of Iraq’s society – would repeat a tragic error. Kurrild-Klitgaard puts it best: To grant specific political privileges to various minorities merely on the basis of their religion or ethnicity in a country so relatively heterogeneous as Iraq would surely be a recipe for a disaster, since it will only cement the differences and lock the groups into a zero-sum game. (This in fact is what was tried in Lebanon, where it was one of the most important reasons for the collapse of the country) (25) This does not mean Iraq, and Iraq’s Christians, should be left to their own devices. However, the violence that is surrounding Iraq’s Christians cannot be insulated, or indeed halted, by providing them with “welfare and education”. Rather, initiating a plan to bolster Iraq’s economy, as a whole, and rebuild its infrastructure to contribute to the safety and future of a unified Iraq would go a lot further towards promoting peace and stability within the country. The problems that are facing Iraq’s Christians illustrates the dangers that can come about if external involvement, particularly faith-based organizations, are not scrutinized and held to certain standards by the governments supporting them. However, it is not solely external players that present barriers to accepting pluralism. Section III. Internal Issues In addition to the issues that external groups are causing, there are internal aspects of the Iraqi government that send contradictory messages about the acceptance of religious and ethnic pluralism. The internal issues that are explored in this section include problems with electoral process, inconsistencies in the current constitution, and regional difficulties that challenge a united Iraqi future. The first issue with elections was whether or not to include specific groups that had been seen as undermining democracy – such as the clergy, the military, and the Ba’ath party – in politics (Dawisha, Dawisha). The second issue is the ethnic and religious makeup of Iraq; with a population of approximately 23 million Iraqis, Arabs are 75-80%, Kurds are around 15-20% and Turkmen, Assyrians and additional ethnic minorities make up the remaining few percent (Kurrild-Klitgaard 16). Religiously, the Shi’ias dominate with between 50-55% of the population, Sunnis are around 40-42%, Christians 2-3%, and Jews and other groups are less than 1% of the population(Kurrild-Klitgaard 16). The issue in this case is that, with a democracy in place, the group with the numerical advantage would take control; a tyranny of the majority is a concern in any democracy (Byman 52). Liberal democracies expect a changing majority but when voting groups are tightly-knit, “liberal democracy, in such circumstances, produces illiberal results” (Byman 52). Thus it is understandable that minorities would be opposed to democracies in situations like this (Byman 53). Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard calls on the genius of James Madison and the founding of the United States when he argues that these factions will only help promote democracy (25). Dawisha and Dawisha agree with Kurrild-Klitgaard that, rather than seeing the cleavages as a barrier to democracy, all of this “antagonism could serve a constructive purpose: having factions zealously check each other’s power could actually promote democracy at the expense of rigid communal particularism” (Dawisha, Dawisha 37). The complexity of factions in Iraq can contribute to equal protection. Cecelia Lynch adds that “religious identity may relate to other identities in several different ways: it may overtake other identities, compete with them, or take a back seat to them (and this hierarchy of relationships may change over time)” (4). It is not simply Sunnis versus Shi’ia or Arabs versus Kurds, there are both Sunni and Shi’ia Arabs and Sunni and Shi’ia Kurds for example; this unique mix of ethnic and religious groups make it feasible for a well balanced democracy to form, given the right circumstances. In spite of the roughly 300 terrorist attacks that took place on election day in January 2005, an impressive 58% of eligible voters participated (a higher rate of turnout than in most U.S. presidential elections) (Inglehart et al. 503). Conscious of the presence of ethnic and religious cleavages, the policies supported by the United States have emphasized a significant amount of decentralization and highly federated structure to include “the participation of all of Iraq’s communities in decisionmaking, and binding guarantees of local community rights” (Byman 54). This proved to be relatively successful, according to Byman, because at local levels “elections have been free and competitive, there is considerable freedom of the press, basic civil liberties are secure, and bureaucracies are responsive to popular concerns and surprisingly accountable” (Byman 70). For George, the only way for liberal democracy to survive in Iraq is to have a constitution that establishes “fair terms of social and political engagement for all groups, and indeed, all citizens” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 2). The Iraqi constitution appears to be a badly designed text that leaves much to be wanted in a document that plays a crucial role in bringing about peace The Current Constitution Saunders explains that constitutions can set a “framework for a mutually respectful exchange of views, which hopefully leads to religious reconciliation (or at least peaceful coexistence)” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 4). Muqtadar Khan agrees that “different ethnic and religious groups have succeeded in achieving mutually acceptable or tolerable levels of power sharing in such places and have also succeeded in establishing a durable degree of confidence in each other’s commitment to the social contract and hence are enjoying the fruits of stability” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 4). However, skeptics about the viability of the current Iraqi constitution make several compelling arguments. Intisar Rabb argues it is not a matter of the history of the countries like Iraq but rather the “motives and means of the leaders, and maybe most significantly the outside influences… and civil society” but that these rely on the presence of physical and economic security that is currently absent in Iraq (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 3). Khan cautions that we might taking these constitutions “more seriously than even the Bush administration that wrote them or the governments whose job it is to apply them” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 12). The importance of a fair, representative and pluralistic constitution is clear but the ‘trick’, according to Dawisha and Dawisha, is “to work out a constitutional arrangement that makes sense of Iraq’s social and cultural mosaic, transforming diversity into an agent for positive change” (37-38). However, the current constitution is, at best, vague and contradictory if not impracticable. Rabb breaks down the three pivotal sections of the constitution and explains their conflicting interests. The three sections, religion and Islamic law, rights and freedoms, and democratic processes, are the first three sections of Article 2 of the constitution. Article 2.1 (a) states “Islam is the official religion of the state and a basic source of legislation. No law can be passed that contradicts settled Islam (legal) rules”. Article 2.1 (b) states “no law can be passed that contradicts the principles of democracy” and Article 2.1 (c) states that “no law can be passed that contradicts the basic rights and freedoms outlined in this constitution” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 5). The issue here is not declaring Islam, or indeed any religion, as the official state religion, Rabb gives several examples of modern states that have successfully done this[6]. However, the constitutions of these countries have included “provisions for the equality and rights of their citizens, regardless of religious affiliation” and the state must “ensure that the established religion does not impinge on the freedoms of any of its citizens and that religion will never impede fair democratic processes” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 5). Therefore while it is not an issue to have an official state religion, the current structure of the Iraqi constitution is worrisome because the three main articles (and several other articles) conflict. Khan illustrates these contradictions by arguing that “if the constitution considers Islam and Democracy compatible than A and C are redundant. If Islam and Democracy are not considered compatible, then A and B are contradictory and so are provisions A and C” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 7). Additionally, Article 14 (guaranteeing religious and gender equality) can contradict Article 2.1 A (Islam) depending on the given interpretation of Islam (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 7). In other words, the relative freedom of Iraqis is based on an unspecified interpretation of Islam that leaves much to be desired by this important document. However, this does not mean that Islam and democracy are incompatible or should not both be a part of the constitution; simply, that the constitution needs to clearly enumerate the equal rights of all Iraqi citizens. Alfred Stepan’s concept of “twin toleration” offers an option for blending the lines between state and religion; he defines ‘twin toleration’ as: A sufficient degree of autonomy from religion for democracy not to be constrained by theocrats, and a sufficient degree of autonomy of religion from the state for religious citizens and organizations to exercise their religious rights and their rights of expression, not only in their places of worship, but in civil and political society as well (5). Additionally, the U.S. should “support religious freedom in majority communities…[and] protect religious minorities” (“Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration” 33). This latter point is vital for dealing with the dynamics of Iraq’s various ethnic and religious groups. The importance of ethnic and religious plurality has been explained; unfortunately, Iraq already bears witness to the tragic consequences when this plurality fails or was never implemented. Iraq’s dwindling Christian population has suffered, and continues to suffer, as a result of the uneven treatment that was given to aid organizations at the onset of the U.S. invasion as well as the careless rhetoric that ignited a fierce but understandable backlash from Iraq’s Muslim population. As the most ethnically diverse country in the Arab world (Rayburn 38), Iraq has issues with its religious minorities. Rabb claims that the “particular challenge to most modern Muslim countries had to do with the treatment of religious minorities” (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy”8). She emphasizes modern Muslim countries because Islam, historically, has been accepting of different faiths, as the millet system showed, but accepting is not the same as equal rights (Rabb 8). Non-Muslims (specifically Christians and Jews) were allowed to practice their faiths in peace but were not extended equal rights as citizens under the law (Rabb 8). Because of Iraq’s history of accepting diversity it is imperative and plausible that a constitution fully adapts from the millet system to not only the tolerance of, but the acceptance of, all members of society. However, a modified and unifying constitution is not the only internal issue facing a united Iraq. Uniting or Dividing? After the 2003 invasion, the internal violence, often labeled a civil war, began to escalate. In 2004, violence was inflicted by Sunni insurgent groups loyal to Saddam and hoping to expel the U.S., but by 2006 the Shi’ia had launched self defense and retaliatory attacks against the Sunni’s (Fearon 5). The estimate of 60,000 deaths (from 2003-2006), according to James Fearon, would make Iraq the 9th deadliest civil war since 1945; it is also unlikely to end anytime soon[7] (4). However, this violence is not abnormal for a state transitioning to democracy. According to Byman, Azerbaijan-Armenia, Georgia, Pakistan and Tajikistan faced violence when transitioning to a democracy in ethnically divided societies (59). Fearon compares the level of factionalism among the Sunnis and Shi’as to those found in Somalia and argues that both groups believe they could have more control of the government without a U.S. presence (Fearon 3). Fearon also argues that power-sharing is seldom successful in situations like these because “civil wars cause combatants to be organized in a way that produces mutually reinforcing fears and temptations”; in other words, “combatants are afraid that the other side will use force to grab power and at the same time are tempted to use force to grab power themselves” (Fearon 8). The common denominator for an Iraqi state, according to Fearon, is the shared interest in oil revenue. However, he argues that it might take more violence, indeed a civil war between the Sunni, Shi’ia and Kurdish majorities, to reach peaceful power-sharing (Fearon 14). Civil war could convince the Shi’ia that it would be more expensive to deal with a Sunni insurgency than to include them in profit-sharing from oil revenue, while the Sunni’s would recognize that they will never regain complete control of Iraq. Additionally, the Kurds, happy with their new-found autonomy, have an interest in access to southern oil pipelines (Fearon 14), resulting in a potential three-way peace between the Sunni and Shi’ia Arabs and the Kurds of Iraq. This paper argues that promoting an Iraqi identity and encouraging a unified Iraq is the best option for the country. Iraq has many issues it has to face but it will be better equipped to face these challenges as a unified country that can prosper from the shared oil revenue and the benefits of a pluralistic, democratic country. For Dawisha, the existence of “multiple, in some cases vigorously competing, identities…allowed Iraq’s rulers to define for the country a succession of national identities more often than not for no other reason than to serve the political interests of their regimes” (567). However, Kurrild-Klitgaard makes an interesting and hopeful observation: “After all, Iraq today is not much more Islamic than Germany was Christian in the mid-20th century, or than Turkey was Islamic in the early 20th century, yet these countries managed to adopt secular constitutions under conditions, which in many ways were as bad or worse than those facing Iraq today” (Kurrild-Klitgaard 23). The underlying issue with allowing Kurdistan to separate and become an independent state has to do with the stability of Iraq. Kurdistan, the semi-autonomous region of Northern Iraq granted to the Kurds (considered one of the largest stateless nations in the world) after the Gulf War by the U.S. (Flashpoints), is another issue threatening the stability of a unified Iraqi future. Secessionism becomes more of an issue with democratization (58) and federalism (60), according to Byman. The Kurdish population is divided between Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and suffered heavily under Saddam’s regime. While 86 percent of Arab Iraqi’s are “very proud” to be Iraqi, only 34 percent of Kurds agree (Inglehart et al. 499). The concern is that in the coming years, the Kurds will attempt to achieve complete autonomy/sovereignty from the rest of Iraq. Kurrild-Klitgaard agrees this might “only seem natural given the rather artificial, short and unhappy history of the Iraqi state”, (21) but Byman argues it would be unwise to grant Kurdistan sovereignty: A federal system based on ethnic or religious divisions would worsen this identity crisis. By emphasizing ethnicity, religion, tribe, or any other feature, the new regime would make an ‘Iraqi’ identity less rewarding. Individuals would have a disincentive to identify along national lines, and common vehicles of nation building, such as education in a common language and a shared history, could not be employed (65-66). Dawisha and Dawisha agree with Byman that it would be a “mistake to create only three ethnically or religiously based federal units: a Kurdish north, a Shi’ia south, and a Sunni center” because this would only “entrench current divisions and might even lead to ethnic cleansing” (Dawisha, Dawisha 39). Instead, they argue it would be wiser to maintain the current system of 18 units that encourage resource sharing and political dialogue (Dawisha, Dawisha 38). Additionally, Fearon argues that it is not clear that “new Sunni, Shi’ia, and Kurdish states would be much more peaceful than Iraq is at present” (14). Cautioning against outside interference, Fearon explains that it is “conceivable that civil war will someday lead the combatants in Iraq to agree on Iraq’s partition anyway, but this is a decision for Iraqis rather than outsiders to make” (Fearon 14). A unified Iraq presents the most stable option for the country’s future. Conclusion Since 2003, there has been a lack of acceptance of the pluralism that has historically existed in Iraq. Both external and internal factors have exacerbated ethnic and religious cleavages in a society that was relatively tolerant of its diversity. Externally, faith-based aid groups were given preferential treatment by the U.S. government following the invasion. I assert that this is a primary cause for the subsequent violence against Iraq’s Christian minority. Religious divisions were solidified through the politics of proselytizing, preferential treatment, and what appeared to be a ‘Christianity versus Islam’ narrative. Internally, the Iraqi constitution is contradictory and vaguely written – which leads to confusion about the equal rights of all members of Iraqi society – needs to be re-written. As Kurrild-Klitgaard states, “democracy alone will not solve the problems, and in fact democracy all alone – without any further, deeper institutional reforms – may very well produce the worst of all outcomes” (18). Additionally, the issue of Kurdistan and creating a cohesive Iraqi identity are critical for the stability of the country. This paper builds on the literature regarding the importance of pluralism, the disadvantages to faith-based aid, and the importance of a representative constitution. It does not offer a policy solution for the violence that engulfs Iraq; rather, it explores the obstacles, both external and internal, to Iraq’s acceptance and support of pluralism to create a stable country and the possibility of a peaceful future. Works Cited Ajami, Fouad. “Iraq and the Arabs’ Future”. Foreign Affairs. Vol 82, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2003): 2- 18. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. Byman, Daniel. “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities”. International Security. Vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 47-78. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. Caldwell, Deborah. “Group to aid, Proselytize in Postwar Iraq”. ABC News. 27 March. Accessed 26 Feb, 2011. http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90739&page=1Cha, Ariana Eunjung. “Christian Missionaries Battle for Hearts and Minds in Iraq”. Washington Post. 16 May 2004. Accessed 25 Feb, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30001-2004May15.html Dawisha, Adeed. “’Identity’ and Political Survival in Saddam’s Iraq”. Middle East Journal. Vol. 53, no. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 553-567. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha. “How to Build a Democratic Iraq”. International Security. Vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 47-78. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. “Decent Shelter for All: Roles of Faith-inspired Organizations”. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University, 2009. Web: 12 January 2011. <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/list> Eshoo, Anna. “Eshoo Urges Support of Iraqi Religious Diversity”. 20 July, 2005. Congresswoman Anna Eshoo’s website. Accessed 12 March, 2011. http://eshoo.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=75&Itemid=159 Fearon, James. “Iraq’s Civil War”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 86, no. 2 (Mar-April 2007): 2-15. Web. 24 Jan. 2011 "Flashpoints: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts." Middle East Conflict Reference Library. Ed. Sara Pendergast, Ralph G. Zerbonia, and Tom Pendergast. Vol. 1: Almanac. Detroit: UXL, 2006. 244-259. Gale Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 26 Feb. 2011. Inglehart, Ronald, Mansoor Moaddel, and Mark Tessler. “Xenophobia and In-Group Solidarity in Iraq: A Natural Experiment on the Impact of Insecurity”. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 4, no. 3 (September 2006): 495-505. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. "Iraq” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011. Web. 18 Feb. 2011. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/293631/IraqIsmael, Tareq, and Jacqueline Ismael. “Whither Iraq? Beyond Saddam, Sanctions and Occupation”. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 26, no. 4/5 (2005): 609-629. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. “Blood, Baath and Beyond: The Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq”. Public Choice. Vol. 119, no. 1/2 (April 2004): 13-30. Web. 24 Jan. 2011 Lynch, Cecelia. “Religion, Identity, and the ‘War on Terror’: Insights from Religious Humanitarianism”. Forthcoming, in Pat James ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance. University of Toronto press. Murhpy, Theo. “Civil Society and Islamic Aid: unseen developments and threats”. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Issue 27, July 2004. Accessed 26 Feb, 2011. http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2642 “Proselytism & Religious Freedom in the 21st Century”. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University, 2010. Web: 12 January 2011. <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/list> Rayburn, Joel. “The Last Exit from Iraq”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85, no.2 (March-April 2006): 29- 40. Web. 24 Jan. 2011. “Report of the Symposium on Islam, Constitutions, & Durable Democracy: The Cases of Iraq & Afghanistan”. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University, 2007. Web: 12 January 2011. <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/list> “Report of the Georgetown Symposia on U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy”. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University, 2008. Web: 12 January 2011. <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/list> “Report of the Georgetown Symposium on Religion, Democracy, and the Foreign Policy of the Obama Administration”. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University, 2009. Web: 12 January 2011. http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/list> Stepan, Alfred. “Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal”, in Thomas Banchoff and Robert Wurthnow, eds., Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, forthcoming, Winter 2009. “Vicar: Dire Times for Iraq’s Christians” Dec 2, 2007 (updated 2008). CBS News 60 Minutes. Online segment of documentary. 10 Feb, 2011. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/29/60minutes/main3553612.shtml?tag=con tentMain;contentBody [1] Ismael and Ismael explain that, “[i]t is no longer a secret that the Ba'ath coup d'e'tat of 1963 was facilitated by the covert efforts of the CIA” (9). They quote Ali Salih al-Saadi, a Ba'ath leader of the 1963 coup, as saying that “'we came to power on the CIA train'”. (Ismael, Ismael 9) [2] This shift in power coincided with the 1960s pan-Arab nationalist movement that began with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and swept secular nationalism across the Middle East; making Iraq a “contested zone of Arab nationalist and cold war politics” (Ismael, Ismael 611). [3] The Mujahedeen were a group of Muslim freedom fighters in Afghanistan that were supported by the U.S. in order to oust the occupying Soviet Union. [4] Several ‘codes of conduct’ include “Towards Common Witness: A call to adopt responsible relationships in mission and to renounce proselytism” and “The Cape Town Commitment: A Confession of Faith and a Call to Action”. [5] There are groups like The NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq, The National Democratic Institute, and The International Republican Institute that claim to be non-profit and non-partisan groups that could provide an alternative to faith-based aid. 6 Finland, Greece, and the United Kingdom each have an official state religion, in this case some branch of Christianity (“Islam, Constitutions & Durable Democracy” 5). [7] Fearon explains that “[civil wars like Iraq’s] long duration seems to result from the way in which most of these conflicts have been fought: namely, by rebel groups using guerrilla tactics, usually operating in rural regions of postcolonial countries with weak administrative, police, and military capabilities” (4). --------------------- - BACK TO INDEX - REPLY - QUOTE - EDIT - DELETE -

The full topic: The Importance of Pluralism for a Stable Iraq.... pancho - Wednesday, April 13 2011, 12:09:24 (UTC) Re: The Importance of Pluralism for a Stable Iraq.... Marcello - 04/15 06:28

***

Powered by RedKernel V.S. Forum 1.2.b9